



Official Newsletter of the Michigan Company of Military Historians & Collectors
May 9, 2016

“If you have to go, you want LeMay in the lead bomber; but you never want LeMay deciding whether or not you have to go.” **President J.F. Kennedy, 1960**

“It is better for us to hang ninety-nine innocent (suspicious) men than to let one guilty pass, for the guilty one endangers the peace of society.” **Natchez FreeTrader, November 2, 1860.** Southern hysteria following the execution of John Brown commenting on the visits of mysterious Yankee strangers.

“Let us therefore animate and encourage each other, and show the whole world that a Freeman, contending for liberty on his own ground, is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth.” **General George Washington, 1776.** Found in All The Ways We Kill And Die by Brian Castner

Our May speaker will be Marion Graff. He is a WWII Navy veteran. He has earned six battle stars and was on board the *West Virginia* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945

MEETINGS take place the second Monday of every month at the **Riverfront Hotel Grand Rapids** 270 Ann St NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (616) 363-9001. Socializing begins at 6:00 (1800), dinner at 7:00 (1900), business meeting 7:15 (1915), and program at 8:00 (2000).

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Company Notes

- ◆ **The next Video for Sid's Travel Series will be held on the Wednesday before Memorial Day (May 25, 2016 at Marge's Donut Den. It will start at 9:30AM with song and prayer. This will be a special event featuring a 24 minute Video of Sid leading a tour on LST (Landing Ship Tank) 393 docked in Muskegon. Sid has volunteered on LST 393 since its rededication as a museum in Muskegon in 2000. During the tour Sid often recalls war time experiences as he served on a similar ship, LST 651, during WWII.**

The editorial opinions and articles in *The Cannon Report* do not represent any official position of the Michigan Company of Military Historians and Collectors (MCMH&C) only the opinions of the editor. The MCMH&C is a non-partisan, non-ideological association. All members are welcome to submit material, letters, “For the good of the Company items”, etc. Direct inquiries or comments to kuziaks@me.com

The Cuban Missile Crisis

October 16-28, 1962 are the dates most historians attribute to the events resulting from the attempt of Russia to place nuclear missiles in Cuba. Scott Sagan, consultant to the Chiefs of Staff at that time and now a political science professor at Stanford writes in his book *The Limits of Safety* that this “crisis was the most severe test of America’s nuclear command and control system during the Cold War. Our military was in the highest state of readiness for nuclear war that U.S. forces had ever attained and for the longest period of time (thirty days) that they had maintained an alert. Most historians attribute the peaceful resolution of the crisis to decisions made by John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev—to the rational behavior of leaders controlling their military forces. But that sense of control may have been illusory. The Cuban Missile Crisis could have ended with a nuclear war, despite the wishes of Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Eric Schlosser comments in *Command and Control* that “with hundreds of bombers, missiles, and naval vessels prepared to strike, the risk of accidents and misunderstandings was ever present. At the height of the confrontation, while Kennedy and his advisors were preoccupied with the Soviet missiles in Cuba, an Atlas long-range missile was test-launched at Vandenberg Air Force Base, without the president’s knowledge or approval. Other missiles at Vandenberg had already been placed on alert with nuclear warheads—and the Soviet Union could have viewed the Atlas launch as the beginning of an attack. The Jupiter missiles in Turkey were an issue of great concern to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara throughout the crisis. McNamara ordered American troops to sabotage the missiles if Turkey seemed ready to launch them. But he was apparently unaware that nuclear weapons already had been loaded onto fighter planes in Turkey. The control of those weapons was ‘so loose, it jars your imagination,’ Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Melgard, the commander of the NATO squadron, told Sagan. ‘In retrospect,’ Melgar said, ‘there were some guys you wouldn’t trust with a 22 rifle, much less a thermonuclear bomb.’”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had established five defense readiness conditions (DEFCON) for the armed forces. DEFCON 5 was the state of military readiness during normal peacetime operations; DEFCON 1 meant that war was imminent. On October 22 Kennedy addressed the nation while the Joint Chiefs ordered the military to DEFCON 3. Polaris Submarines left their ports and headed for locations within range of the Soviet Union. Fighter-interceptors patrolled American airspace with Genies and Falcons, atomic antiaircraft rockets, in case Soviet planes tried to attack from Cuba. Nearly two hundred B-47 bombers left SAC bases and flew to dozens of civilian airports throughout the United States—to Birmingham, Philadelphia and Tulsa; to Chicago and Detroit; to Portland, Spokane and Minneapolis. Dispersing the bombers from SAC bases made them less vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. Aircrews slept on the ground beside their planes, which were loaded with hydrogen bombs, as commercial airliners took off and landed on nearby runways. The number of B-52s on airborne alert was increased more than five fold. Every day about sixty-five of the bombers circled within striking distance of the Soviet Union. Each of them carried a Hound Dog missile with a thermonuclear warhead as well as two 4 megaton or four 2 megaton hydrogen bombs (Hiroshima’s bomb yield was 16 kilotons).

On October 24, the United States Navy blockaded Cuba and the Strategic Air Command went to DEFCON 2 for the first time in its history. 250,000 American troops were prepared for an invasion of Cuba. The U.S. Air Force units in Europe went to DEFCON 5. Kennedy and McNamara were concerned that with so many nuclear weapons on high alert, something could go wrong. There was no direct secure communication between the White House and the Kremlin. The distrust Kennedy felt toward Khrushchev’s impulsive and unpredictable behavior complicated efforts to end the crisis

peacefully. The Soviet leader wanted to test Kennedy's mettle and see how much they could gain from this crisis. Both countries publicly supported peace, diplomacy, and a settlement of their differences through negotiation, but both behaved less nobly in secret. During the summer of 1962, the Kennedy administration was trying to overthrow the government of Cuba and assassinate Fidel Castro. Robert Kennedy guided the CIA's covert program Operation Mongoose enlisting help from Cuban exiles and the Cosa Nostra. McNamara supervised the planning for a full-scale invasion of the island should Operation Mongoose succeed. Meanwhile, Khrushchev approved a KGB plan to destabilize and overthrow the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. His goal was to make Cuba a military outpost of the Soviet Union, armed with nuclear weapons, much like Western Europe and Turkey were American outposts.

During one of the most dangerous incidents, Major Charles Maultsby, the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane, got lost and inadvertently strayed into Soviet airspace. His mistake occurred on October 27, 1962—the same day as the Atlas missile launch and the shooting down of a U-2 over Cuba. Maultsby was supposed to collect air samples above the North Pole, seeking radioactive evidence of a Soviet nuclear test. But the flight path was new, the *aurora borealis* interfered with his attempt at celestial navigation and Maultsby soon found himself flying over Siberia, pursued by Soviet fighter planes. The U-2 ran out of fuel and American fighters took off to escort Maultsby back to Alaska. Under DEFCON 3 rules of engagement, the fighter planes had the authority to fire their atomic anti-aircraft missiles and shoot down the Soviet planes. A dogfight between the two air forces was somehow avoided, the U-2 landed safely—and McNamara immediately halted the air sampling program. Nobody at the Pentagon had considered the possibility that those routine flights could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

What McNamara saw was that highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of so many people was difficult to control if not impossible. Accidents and unauthorized acts could well occur on both sides. Like the first confrontation between the British army and the Massachusetts Militia at Lexington, 1775, neither Major Pitcairn or Captain Parker wanted a shooting war to commence but without an order being given, a shot was fired. In an attempt to avoid a skirmish a war began.

Khrushchev had no desire to start a nuclear war, he was well aware that that the Soviet Union's strategic forces were vastly inferior to those of the United States. He secretly ordered his ships not to violate the quarantine but denounced it as "an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward... a world nuclear-missile war." Bertrand Russell agreed with the Soviet leader and sent Kennedy a well-publicized telegram. "Your action desperate," it said. "Threat to human survival. No conceivable justification. Civilized man condemns it... End this madness." Khrushchev maintained a defiant facade but faulty intelligence led him to believe that an American attack was imminent, he wrote a letter to Kennedy, offering a deal: the Soviet Union would withdraw the missiles from Cuba, if the United States promised never to invade. The letter took almost eleven hours to reach Kennedy. His advisors were encouraged by its conciliatory tone and decided to accept—but went to bed before replying. Meanwhile another letter was sent to Washington and broadcasted on Radio Moscow with an additional demand: missiles removed from Cuba if U.S. removes missiles from Turkey.

When the U-2 was shot down over Cuba confusion on both sides reigned. McNamara pushed for a limited air strike to destroy the missiles while the Joint Chiefs recommended a large-scale attack. The situation was plagued by confusion and miscommunications. Finally Kennedy sent a cable to the Soviets accepting the first offer and not acknowledging the second. But Robert Kennedy was instructed to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin and agree to the second demand if it was not made public. Getting rid of dangerous and obsolete missiles in Turkey to avert a nuclear holocaust seemed like a good idea. Both leaders feared that any military action would escalate to a nuclear war.

Eric Schlosser goes on to write that “pushed to the brink, Kennedy and Khrushchev chose to back down. But Kennedy emerged from the crisis looking much tougher—his concession to the Soviets not only remained secret but was vehemently denied. Air Force General Curtis LeMay, among others, suspected that some sort of deal had been struck. Asked at a Senate hearing whether the Jupiters in Turkey had been traded for the missiles in Cuba, McNamara replied, ‘Absolutely not... the Soviet Government did raise the issue... (but the) President absolutely refused even to discuss it.’” Secretary of State Dean Rusk repeated the lie. In order to deflect attention from the charge, members of the administration told friendly journalists, off the record, that Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, had urged Kennedy to trade NATO missiles in Turkey, Italy, and Great Britain for the missiles in Cuba, but the President had refused—another lie. A reference to the secret deal was later excised from Robert Kennedy’s diary after his death. A virile myth had been promoted by the administration: when the leaders of the two superpowers stood eye to eye, threatening to fight over Cuba, Khrushchev was the one who was said to have blinked.

The truly positive result from this episode was the establishment of a hot line linking the Kremlin with the Pentagon, with additional terminals in the White House and the Communist Party in Moscow. At the height of the crisis, urgent messages had been encoded by hand then given to a Western Union messenger who arrived at the Soviet Embassy on a bicycle. Ambassador Dobrynin could only pray that the message would go directly to the Western Union office without delay and the rider would not stop and chat with some girl on the way.

SIOP

When nations go to war they customarily have an operational plan that proposes a course of action. The British, during the Revolutionary War wanted to separate New England from the rest of the colonies. When that failed they chose a Southern strategy. During the American Civil War, the United States Navy had the Anaconda Plan, where they slowly strangled the South by blockading her ports and preventing needed supplies from reaching her army. When this nation developed the *Bomb* and ways to deliver it, a policy of “massive retaliation” was believed to be the most effective. Our defense relied entirely upon nuclear weapons but Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was having doubts. With the Soviets now in possession of the hydrogen bomb and long-range missiles the American response to every act of Soviet aggression, large or small, with an all-out atomic attack seemed implausible. Dulles urged the Joint Chiefs to come up with a new strategic doctrine, one that would give President Eisenhower a variety of military options and allow the United States to fight small-scale, limited wars.

Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor agreed with Dulles and promoted a flexible response, applied incrementally. Admiral Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, did not foresee his Navy as a first strike initiator. The new submarines with Polaris missiles would serve as retaliatory, second strike weapons. But Air Force General Curtis LeMay, showed no interest in a limited war, graduated deterrence, finite deterrence—or anything short of total victory. The United States should never enter a war unless it intended to win. A counterforce policy was the only way to go. Only military targets would be selected and hit with either very high accuracy or very high yield bombs, or both. Because the accuracy of a weapon was less predictable than its yield, LeMay favored the use of powerful weapons. Ones that could miss a target but still destroy it, or destroy multiple targets at once. They would also, unavoidably, kill millions of civilians. LeMay wanted SAC to deploy

hydrogen bombs with a yield of 60 megatons, four thousand times more powerful than the one that destroyed Hiroshima. Until a better plan could be agreed upon, LeMay's position dominated.

By the late 1950's, the absence of a clear targeting policy and the growing size of America's stockpile had created serious command and control problems. We had over 30,000 nuclear devices in our arsenal. Within NATO alone there were atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, thermonuclear warheads, nuclear artillery shells, nuclear depth charges, nuclear land mines, and the Davy Crockett, a recoilless rifle, carried like a bazooka by an infantryman, that fired small nuclear projectiles. But none of these weapons had any sort of lock to prevent somebody from setting them off without permission. Nor was there a clear chain of command as to who could fire them. The Army, Navy, and Air Force all planned to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons but had done nothing to coordinate their efforts. As of 1957, SAC refused to share its target list with the other armed services. When the services finally met to compare war plans, hundreds of "time over target" conflicts were discovered—cases where the Navy and Air Force unwittingly plan to bomb the same target at the same time, causing unnecessary overkill.

Eisenhower ordered General Nathan Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in August, 1960 to resolve the dispute over how a nuclear war would be planned and controlled. A Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff was formed, mainly with Air Force officers, although the other services were represented. The staff was based at SAC headquarters in Omaha and led by SAC's commander. The Navy could keep its Polaris submarines, but the aiming point of their missiles was chosen in Omaha. Twining ordered that a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) be completed by the end of the year. The SIOP would serve as America's nuclear war plan. It would spell out precisely when, how, and by whom every enemy target would be struck. The SIOP would be inflexible. "Atomic operations were to be preplanned for automatic execution to the maximum extent possible."

A National Strategic Target List was compiled from the Air Force's *Bombing Encyclopedia*, a compendium of more than 80,000 potential targets located throughout the world. Once the target list was completed the planners calculated the most efficient way to destroy them. The Joint Chiefs had specified that the odds of a target being destroyed had to be at least 75%, and for some targets the assurance rate had to be higher. Achieving that level of assurance required cross-targeting—aiming more than one nuclear weapon at a single ground zero. After the numbers were crunched, the SIOP often demanded that a target be hit by multiple weapons, arriving from different directions at different times. One high-value target in the Soviet Union would be hit by a Jupiter missile, a Titan missile, an Atlas missile, and hydrogen bombs dropped by three B-52s, simply to guarantee its destruction.

The SIOP would unfold in phases. The "alert force" would be launched in the first hour, the "full force" in waves over the course of twenty-eight hours. George Kistiaowsky, Eisenhower's science advisor visited SAC headquarters in November 1960 to get a sense of how work was progressing. He was shocked by the destructiveness of the SIOP. The damage levels caused by the alert force alone would be so great that any additional nuclear strikes seemed like "unnecessary and undesirable overkill." Kistiaowsky thought that the full force would deliver enough "megatons to kill 4 and 5 times over somebody who was already dead" and that SAC should be allowed to take just "one whack—not ten whacks" at each Soviet target. Nevertheless, he told Eisenhower that is was the best that could be expected under the circumstances. On December 2, 1960, Eisenhower approved the SIOP without requesting any changes (so much for a limited response plan).

The SIOP would take effect the following April. It featured 3,729 targets, grouped into more than 1000 ground zeros, that would be struck by 3,423 nuclear weapons. The targets were located in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Eastern Europe. About 80% were military targets, and the rest were civilian. The SIOP's damage estimates were conservative and based solely on blast effects. They excluded the harm that might be caused by thermal radiation, fires, or fallout. Within three days

of the initial attack about 54% of the Soviet population and 16% of the Chinese population—roughly 220 million people—would be dead. The SIOP was designed for a national emergency, when the survival of the United States was at stake. Once the SIOP was set in motion, it could not be altered, slowed, or stopped. The SIOP soon became one of the most closely guarded secrets in the United States. But the procedures for authorizing a nuclear strike were kept even more secret. For years the Joint Chiefs had asked not only for custody of America's nuclear weapons but also for the authority to use them.

In the previous December, 1959, Eisenhower had agreed to let high-ranking commanders decide whether to use nuclear weapons, during an emergency, when the president could not be reached. Well aware that such an authorization could allow someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative would be to let American and NATO forces be overrun and destroyed if communications with Washington were disrupted. Eisenhower's order was kept secret from Congress, the American people, and NATO allies. Supposedly it made sense as a military tactic but it introduced an element of uncertainty to the decision-making process. Under certain circumstances, a U.S. commander under attack with conventional weapons would be allowed to respond with nuclear weapons. Eisenhower understood the contradictions at the heart of America's command-and-control system—but could not find a way to resolve them during his last few weeks in office.

In January, 1961 a new administration occupied the presidency and the Soviets started testing the resolve of the new president and NATO. A crisis over Berlin was escalating and the new government was slowly made aware of our limited military options. When Secretary of Defense McNamara was made aware of SIOP and had read it, what struck him first was the precision used to ensure the total annihilation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. All of the fighters and bombers sent to Russia would be on a one way mission, there were no plans for their return, no survivors. But the most shocking discovery for McNamara was when he reached the last page of the SIOP plan. There was no mention of any post conflict response by the military. McNamara looked at all the assembled generals in utter disbelief. He asked for the plans for the restoration of the country and Europe, there were none. Once SIOP was initiated there was no turning back. This was an example of brinkmanship in reverse. We, ourselves, would be the source of our own destruction.

Kennedy's national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, felt that an alternative plan to SIOP was urgently needed. The bomber-generals who had ruled the USAF and were largely responsible for SIOP were slowly being replaced by fighter pilots who achieved star rank. Like the long time admirals who dominated the Big Gun Navy (battleships v. carriers) they were being challenged by a new way to counter Soviet aggression; but there was not enough time to make any fundamental changes in SIOP. As the crisis over Berlin deepened, NATO commanders were ordered not to use any nuclear weapons. McNamara was afraid that an infantryman with a Davy Crockett could be the first weapon fired at an invading Soviet Army. The resolution of this situation is another story but what did result from this conflict was a deepening distrust of the American military mindset.

The reasoning behind SIOP and the permissiveness rampant in the military for control of our nuclear arsenal was beyond comprehension to our civilian leadership. It set the stage for a complete disregard of anything resembling a policy statement originating from the higher commands. There was such a lack of confidence in the ability of the military to make rational, strategic decisions that this distrust even extended to their ability to make sound tactical choices. Several civilian administrations would have to come and go before the military restored any credibility to their leadership. But the success in one conventional war (1990) did not necessarily extend to success in an unconventional one; as we are now all well aware.

Filibuster (military)

A filibuster or freebooter, in the context of foreign policy, is someone who engages in an (at least nominally) unauthorized military expedition into a foreign country or territory to foment or support a revolution. This Spanish term was first applied to persons raiding Spanish colonies and ships in the West Indies, the most famous of whom was Sir Francis Drake with his 1573 raid on Nombre de Dios. With the end of the era of Caribbean piracy in the early 18th century the term fell out of general use. The term filibuster was revived in the mid-19th century to describe the actions of adventurers who tried to take control of various Caribbean, Mexican, and Central-American territories by force of arms. The three most prominent filibusters of that era were Narciso López and John Quitman in Cuba, and William Walker in Baja California, Sonora, and lastly Nicaragua. The term returned to American parlance when used to refer to the Cuban expeditions of Narciso Lopez in 1851. It was used to describe United States citizens who fomented insurrections in Latin America in the mid-19th century (Texas, California, Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia). Filibuster expeditions have also been used as a cover for government approved but deniable operations. Also known as False Flag operations, they have longed been used in both naval and land warfare.

Filibusters are irregular soldiers who act without official authority from their own government, and are generally motivated by financial gain, political ideology, or the thrill of adventure. The freewheeling actions of the filibusters of the 1850s led to the name being applied figuratively to the political act of filibustering in the United States Congress. Unlike a mercenary, a filibuster leader/commander works for himself, while a mercenary leader works for others.

The English term "filibuster" derives from the Spanish *filibustero*, itself deriving originally from the Dutch *vrijbuitter*, "privateer, pirate, robber" (also the root of English "freebooter"). The Spanish form entered the English language in the 1850s, as applied to military adventurers from the United States. The contemporary term false flag describes covert operations that are designed to deceive in such a way that the operations appear as though they are being carried out by entities, groups, or nations other than those who actually planned and executed them. Historically, the term "false flag" has its origins in naval warfare where the use of a flag other than the belligerent's true battle flag served as a *ruse de guerre*, before engaging the enemy, has long been accepted. Operations carried out during peace-time by civilian organizations, as well as covert government agencies, can (by extension) also be called false flag operations if they seek to hide the real organization behind an operation.

In land warfare such operations are generally deemed acceptable in certain circumstances, such as to deceive enemies providing that the deception is not perfidious and all such deceptions are discarded before opening fire upon the enemy. Similarly in naval warfare such a deception is considered permissible provided the false flag is lowered and the true flag raised before engaging in battle: auxiliary cruisers operated in such a fashion in both World Wars, as did Q-ships. Although merchant vessels were encouraged to use false flags for protection. Such masquerades promoted confusion not just for the enemy but for historical accounts: in 1914, the Battle of Trinidad was fought between the British auxiliary cruiser *RMS Carmania* and the German auxiliary cruiser *SMS Cap Trafalgar* which had been altered to look like *Carmania*.

Another notable example was the World War II German commerce raider *Kormoran* which surprised and sank the Australian light cruiser *HMAS Sydney* in 1941 while disguised as a Dutch merchant ship, causing the greatest recorded loss of life on an Australian warship. While *Kormoran* was fatally damaged in the engagement and its crew captured, the outcome represented a considerable

psychological victory for the Germans. Other examples from WWII included a Kriegsmarine ensign used in the St Nazaire Raid that captured a German code book. The old destroyer *HMS Campbeltown*, which the British planned to sacrifice in the operation, was provided with cosmetic modifications that involved cutting the ship's funnels and chamfering the edges to resemble a German Type 23 torpedo boat. By this ruse the British were able to get within two miles of the harbor before the defenses responded. Then the explosive-rigged *Campbeltown* with her commandos successfully disabled and destroyed key dock structures of the port.

Another example of WWII false flag is the trial of Otto Skorzeny, who planned and commanded *Operation Greif*, where German soldiers dressed as American G.I.s misdirected some U.S. reinforcements during the Battle of the Bulge and attacked other unsuspecting Allied units. At a U.S. military tribunal during the Dachau Trials Skorzeny was found not guilty of a crime by ordering his men into action in American uniforms. While he had passed on to his men the warning of German legal experts that if they fought in American uniforms, they would be breaking the laws of war they probably were not doing so simply by wearing American uniforms. During the trial, a number of arguments were advanced to substantiate this position and the German and U.S. military seem to have been in agreement.

In the transcript of the trial, it is mentioned that Paragraph 43 of the Field Manual published by the War Department, United States Army, on 1 October 1940, under the entry Rules of Land Warfare stated 'National flags, insignias and uniforms as a ruse – are allowable. Therefore, commanders are allowed to use such means. Article 23 of the Annex of the IVth Hague Convention, does not prohibit such use, but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to make use of them during a combat. Before opening fire upon the enemy, they must be discarded'. The American Soldiers' Handbook, was also quoted by Defense Counsel: 'The use of the enemy flag, insignia, and uniform is permitted under some circumstances. They are not to be used during actual fighting, and if used in order to approach the enemy without drawing fire, should be thrown away or removed as soon as fighting begins'.

The planned, but never executed, 1962 Operation Northwoods plot by the U.S. Department of Defense for a war with Cuba involved scenarios such as fabricating the hijacking or shooting down of passenger and military planes, sinking a U.S. ship in the vicinity of Cuba, burning crops, sinking a boat filled with Cuban refugees, attacks by alleged Cuban infiltrators inside the United States, and harassment of U.S. aircraft and shipping and the destruction of aerial drones by aircraft disguised as Cuban MiGs. These actions would be blamed on Cuba, and would be a pretext for an invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of Fidel Castro's communist government. It was authored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but then rejected by President John F. Kennedy. The surprise discovery of the documents relating to Operation Northwoods was a result of the comprehensive search for records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by the Assassination Records Review Board in the mid-1990s. Information about Operation Northwoods was later publicized by James Bamford in *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. Anchor Books. pp. 82–91. ISBN 978-0-385-49907-1.

During the 1850s several Americans were involved in various freelance military schemes. Fearful of not being able to extend slavery into the new states being created in California and Kansas, and from the New Mexico territory, Southern “fire-eaters”, active proponents of slavery’s continuation looked to Cuba and Central America as possible inclusion into the United States as slave states. Narciso López was a Venezuelan who wanted to free Cuba from Spanish rule. After a failed revolution he fled to the United States. As soon as he arrived López began planning a filibustering expedition from the United States to liberate Cuba. He made contact with influential American politicians, including John L. O'Sullivan, an expansionist who coined the term "Manifest Destiny".

López recruited Cuban exiles in New York City: a troop of 600 volunteers had gathered on Round Island, Mississippi, with three ships chartered (two in New York and one in New Orleans) to transport them. However, US president Zachary Taylor, who had renounced filibustering as a valid means of U.S. expansion, took steps against López and ordered his ships blockaded and seized; by September 9, all the "roughnecks" had been talked into leaving Round Island.

Undeterred by this setback, López decided to plan a new filibuster and to focus his recruiting effort on the southern United States. As a supporter of slavery himself, López realized the advantages for the South of an independent Cuba. He and some American Southerners hoped that Cuba would become a strong partner in slavery and perhaps, like Texas, join the Union as a slave state. He moved his headquarters to New Orleans and tried to gain popular support by recruiting influential men of the South to join his expedition. He solicited the military help of Senator Jefferson Davis, who had distinguished himself in the Battle of Buena Vista, offering him \$100,000 and "a very fine coffee plantation". Davis, to the great relief of his wife, turned him down, but he recommended one of his friends from the Mexican–American War, Major Robert E. Lee. Lee thought seriously about López's offer, but eventually also decided not to become involved.

Although López failed to recruit these two rising stars, he did win the financial and political support of many influential Southerners including Governor John Quitman of Mississippi, former Senator John Henderson and the editor of the *New Orleans Delta*, Laurence Sigur. López enlisted about six hundred filibusters in his expedition, and successfully reached Cuba in May 1850. His troops seized the town of Cárdenas, carrying a flag that López and Miguel Teurbe Tolon had designed, which later became the flag of modern Cuba. Nevertheless, the local support that he had hoped for failed to materialize when the fighting started. Much of the local population joined the Spanish against López, and he hastily retreated to Key West, where he disbanded the expedition within minutes of landing in order to avoid prosecution under the Neutrality Act. In the aftermath of the expedition, López and many of his supporters were indicted by a federal grand jury. Although the indictments did not end in convictions, they did force Governor John Quitman to resign from his office and face trial. Despite military and legal setbacks, López began planning another expedition, which met with the similar problems and even more disastrous consequences.

In August 1851, López once again departed for Cuba with several hundred men (mostly Americans, Hungarians, Germans and some Cubans). When he arrived, he took one half of his expedition to march inland, while the other half, commanded by Colonel William Crittenden (a former US Army lieutenant), remained on the northern coast to protect supplies. As in his first attempt, the local support that López had counted upon did not answer his appeals. Outnumbered and surrounded by Spanish forces, López and many men were captured. Crittenden's forces shared the same fate. The Spanish executed most of the prisoners, sending others to work in mining labor camps. Those executed included many Americans, Colonel Crittenden, and López himself in Castle La Punta of Havana

The execution of López and his soldiers caused outrage in both the northern and southern United States. Many who did not support the expedition found the Spanish treatment of military prisoners brutal. The strongest reaction occurred in New Orleans, where a mob attacked the Spanish consulate. Despite its failure, López's expedition inspired other filibusters to attack Latin American countries throughout the 1850s, most notably William Walker's invasions of Nicaragua in 1855–1860. Had he been successful, López could have profoundly altered politics in the Americas, giving a strong Caribbean foothold to the United States and spurring its further expansion. Instead, the failure of López and other filibusters discouraged Americans, especially in the South, from adopting expansionist strategies. Faced with the inability of slavery to move southward, many Southerners turned away from expansion and talked instead of secession that eventually led to a Civil War.

Mascots

The custom of adopting mascots originated from troops bringing a pet to war, adopting one at the place they were stationed at or being presented a pet as a gift. Some regimental mascots, such as those of most British infantry regiments, represent their home counties' history. Regiments of the British Army have long been prone to adopt members of the animal world as their mascots: dogs, goats and ponies are just a few that have graced ceremonial parades. When the custom of having regimental mascots first started is not clear; the earliest record is that of a goat belonging to the Royal Welsh Fusiliers in the 1775 American War of Independence. Some mascots in the British Army are indicative of the recruiting area of a regiment, such as the Derbyshire Ram, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Irish Wolfhounds and Welsh Goats. One of the more unusual mascots was a baby bear.

Harry Colebourn (April 12, 1887–September 24, 1947) was a Canadian veterinarian and soldier with the Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corps. Traveling across Canada by rail to the training camp at Valcartier, Quebec, Colebourn came across a hunter in White River, Ontario who had a female black bear cub for sale. Having recently killed the cub's mother, Colebourn purchased the cub for \$20, and named her "Winnie" after his adopted home town of Winnipeg, Manitoba. The tiny cub became a beloved mascot of the soldiers preparing for war. The Canadian contingent of 36,000 men, 7,500 horses and one bear boarded 30 ships and traveled across the Atlantic to Salisbury Plain, England, September, 1914. While staging for France Winnie became an unofficial mascot of the Fort Garry Horse, a militia cavalry regiment. Colebourn himself was attached to the Fort Garry Horse as a veterinarian for their many animals.



Colebourn served three years in France, attaining the rank of major. While in France he boarded Winnie at the London Zoo and later donated her to that institution after his separation.

It was at the London Zoo that Alan Alexander Milne and his son encountered Winnie. The bear was so friendly that after many visits the boy was allowed into the enclosure to play with Winnie. Mr. Milne's son, Christopher Robin, was so taken with the real bear that he named his own teddy bear Winnie-the-Pooh. The Pooh was the name of a neighboring swan.

The boy and his bears, the real and the stuffed one became the inspiration for Christopher's father, A. A. Milne. He already was an accomplished playwright but his story of a fictional bear in the books Winnie-the-Pooh (1926) and The House at Pooh Corner (1928) made him and his son famous.

The granddaughter of Harry Colebourn wrote a book about Winnie for her son Cole. Finding Winnie won The Caldecott Medal in 2015 for Children's Literature. Winnie remained at the zoo until her death in 1934.