



Official Newsletter of the Michigan Company of Military Historians & Collectors
August 10, 2015

“I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the authority of the president. I didn’t fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that’s not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail. Harry Truman commenting on the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur. Plain Speaking (1973)

“I was too weak to defend, so I attacked.” **Attributed to Gen. Robert E. Lee (1807-1870).**

“Audace, audace, toujours audace” (Audacity, audacity, always audacity) **Motto of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.**

“Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity.” **Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War (1812).**

“My life is a mixture of politics and war. The latter is bad enough—but I’ve been trained for it! The former is straight and unadulterated venom! But I have to devote lots of my time, and much more of my good disposition to it.” **General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 27, 1943 in a letter to his wife.**

Our August speaker will be Alvin Treado, a 1964 graduate of West Point. He then served five and one-half years in the United States Army, including two tours as an infantry company commander in the Republic of Vietnam. He served with the 4th Inf.Div 66/67 and with the 1st Cav 68/69.

MEETINGS take place the second Monday of every month at the **Riverfront Hotel Grand Rapids** 270 Ann St NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (616) 363-9001. Socializing begins at 6:00 (1800), dinner at 7:00 (1900), business meeting 7:15 (1915), and program at 8:00 (2000).

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Company Notes

- ◆ **It is with great pleasure to announce that Jay Stone has secured a most outstanding individual to host our November 7, 2016 Open Mess. Dan Hampton, one of the most decorated pilots in USAF history and author of Viper Pilot: A Memoir of Air Combat will be our speaker. LTC Hampton (ret) served from 1986 to 2006. The former fighter jet pilot, who went by “Two Dogs” and has been described as “America’s most experienced” F-16 pilot. He flew missions in the Iraq War, the Kosovo conflict, and the first Gulf War as a Wild Weasel, tasked to destroy enemy radar installations. A true daredevil of the skies.**

Operation Aphrodite/Project Anvil

Competition has always been thought to be a good thing. Efforts expended to meet a common goal were encouraged in the hopes that the most effective and efficient course of action would surface. Unfortunately that has seldom been the case. History is full of examples where separate teams of individuals working on the same project treat each other as enemies, losing sight of their true purpose. Vanity and hubris seem to be the motivation that fuels the efforts of men who behave more like children than the responsible and thoughtful leaders they were assumed to be. Inter-service rivalries that result in the loss of time, money, and lives are the most despicable behaviors that seldom go punished. Our military is full of examples where for the “good of the country” takes a backseat to the “good of my service. The American military is not alone in this type of behavior for the Germans in WWII were also guilty of such machinations.

In 1935, the Third Reich unified its military as the Wehrmacht, which encompassed the navy (Kriegsmarine), the air force (Luftwaffe), and the army (Heer). Such unification was more of an aspiration than a fact. In actual practice the services competed bitterly with one another for resources, honors, and political clout. Relations between the army and the air force were particularly adversarial, and when it was decided to develop advance long-range weapons, instead of working together, the army and air force developed their programs separately and competitively. *Ed. note: In the race to space during the 1950's the Army's Redstone missile and the Navy's Vanguard rocket competed simultaneously to launch the first satellite into space. The Russians beat them both with sputnik in October, 1957. The fight was so acrimonious and racked with numerous failures and so costly that President Eisenhower formed an independent agency, NASA in 1958 to end the bickering. Shortly thereafter America had her first successful satellite launch.*

In 1936 the army decided to create a missile as an extension of traditional long-range artillery. The specifications called for a weapon capable of delivering a one-ton explosive payload over a range at least ten times that of the infamous “Paris Gun” of WWI - about 165 miles, far beyond any conventional cannon. To accomplish this task they decided that a missile was required that would follow a trajectory that would take it into the stratosphere and return to earth, drawn by gravity and travel at least 165 miles (or even more) from its launch point. Meanwhile, the air force began research on a pilotless aircraft which eventually became a remote-controlled drone. Their first success was the Fritz X (*Cannon Report 1/3/2013*), but it had payload limitations since it was launched from a mother aircraft. They then developed a flying bomb called *Vergeltungswaffe 1*, or Vengeance Weapon 1. The British dubbed it the buzz bomb, or the doodlebug. The V-1 was the world's first cruise missile, and the army's V-2 was the first ballistic missile.

The V-1 had two advantages over the V-2. First, it was cheaper and simpler. The airframe was small: a little over 27 feet in length, with a wingspan of just 17.6 feet and a weight of 4,760 pounds. Its explosive payload was 1,870 pounds— not that much less than the 2,200 pound payload of the V-2. Secondly, the V-2 required highly specialized machinery to build while the V-1 was essentially a small airplane. Its pulse-jet engine was extremely simple with few moving parts. The cost of a V-2 was \$400,000 1945 U.S., while the V-1 was only \$21,000 1945 U.S. Recognizing that the V-1 was an eminently more practical weapon, Hitler backed it as an alternative to the V-2—even though he continued to fund that program. He understood that the V-2 offered greater range and moderately greater destructive power as well as the ability to launch from specially hardened concrete bunkers or—later— mobile launch vehicles. In contrast, the V-1 required a launching system using compressed steam to catapult the rocket bomb along a lengthly inclined ramp. These ramps were difficult to conceal and highly recognizable from the air by Allied reconnaissance pilots.

The most important advantage of the V-2 was that as a ballistic missile with a maximum speed of 3,580 mph and a trajectory that took it between 55 and 128 miles before it descended to its target, the V-2 was impossible to defend against in flight. In contrast, the V-1 flew at 400 mph (fast, but still possible to intercept) at an altitude of two or three thousand feet. It was vulnerable to ground-based anti-aircraft fire or to the action of fighter aircraft. Lacking a pilot it was incapable of evasive maneuvers. After D-Day Allied fighters could intercept the V-1s over the Channel. P-51 Mustang pilots learned to maneuver their planes so that their wings broke up the airflow above the incoming V-1. This required sliding the fighter's wingtip to within six inches of the lower surface of the V-1 wing. Doing this would flip the V-1 wing up, disrupting the craft's gyros and sending it into an out-of-control dive. As long as this tactic was executed close to the Channel and away from big cities, the crash and resulting detonation were relatively harmless to civilians. Over 30,000 V-1s were produced during the war with around 9,251 fired at targets in Britain. Of these only 2,419 rockets reached London killing 6,184 people, injuring 17,981 and damaging or destroying 127,000 structures. After the French launch sites were captured, Antwerp became a popular target and was hit by 2,448 V-1s between October 1944 and March 1945. A total of around 9,000 were fired at targets in Continental Europe from sites in Germany. Though V-1s only struck their target 25% of the time, they proved more economical than the Luftwaffe's bombing campaign of 1940/41. Regardless, the V-1 was largely a terror weapon and had little overall impact on the outcome of the war.

The V-2, on the other hand, caused a great consternation among the Allied leaders. There was talk of a new German weapon, the V-3. It was assumed to be a more powerful version of the V-2 and would be launched from sites that were within 1/2 degree of the Great Circle Route to New York (the shortest distance to NYC). In actuality it was a super gun working on the multi-charge principle whereby secondary propellant charges are fired to add velocity to a projectile. The gun used multiple propellant charges placed along the barrel's length and timed to fire as soon as the projectile passed them, to provide an additional boost. Because of their greater suitability and ease of use, solid-fuel rocket boosters were used instead of explosive charges. These were arranged in symmetrical pairs along the length of the barrel, angled to project their thrust against the base of the projectile as it passed. Only four shells were fired before the launch site at Mimoyecques was captured by the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division on September 5, 1944, without resistance.

The Fortress of Mimoyecques was an underground military complex built between 1943 and 1944. It was intended to house a battery of V-3 cannons aimed at London, 103 miles away and was not a launch site for a new German intercontinental missile. The complex consisted of a network of tunnels dug under a chalk hill, linked to five inclined shafts in which 25 V-3 guns would have been installed, all targeted on London. The guns would have been able to fire ten dart-like explosive projectiles a minute – 600 rounds every hour – into the British capital, which Winston Churchill later commented would have constituted "the most devastating attack of all." The Allies knew little about the V-3 but identified the site as a possible launching base for V-2 ballistic missiles, based on reconnaissance photographs and fragmentary intelligence from French sources. Mimoyecques was targeted for intensive bombardment by the Allied air forces from late 1943 onwards. Construction work was seriously disrupted, forcing the Germans to abandon work on part of the complex. The rest was partly destroyed on July 6, 1944 by No. 617 Squadron RAF, which used ground-penetrating 5,400-kilogram (11,900 lbs) "Tallboy" earthquake bombs to collapse tunnels and shafts, entombing hundreds of workers underground. The Germans halted construction at Mimoyecques as the Allies advanced up the coast following the Normandy landings but still left the impression that the site was still active, hence Operation Aphrodite.

Aphrodite and Anvil were the World War II code names of United States Army Air Forces and United States Navy operations to use B-17 and B-24 bombers as precision-guided munitions against

bunkers and other hardened/reinforced enemy facilities. By late 1943, General Henry H. Arnold had directed Brigadier General Grandison Gardner's electronic engineers at Eglin Field, Florida, to outfit war-weary bombers with automatic pilots so that they could be remotely controlled. The plan was first proposed to Major General James H. Doolittle some time in 1944. Doolittle approved the plan for Operation Aphrodite on June 26, and assigned the 3rd Bombardment Division with preparing and flying the drone aircraft. Old B-17 Flying Fortress bombers were stripped of all normal combat armament and all other non-essential gear (armor, guns, bomb racks, transceiver, seats, etc.), relieving about 12,000 lbs. (5,400 kg) of weight. To allow easier exit when the pilot and co-pilot were to parachute out, the canopy was removed. The drone was to fly at 2,000 feet controlled by an accompanying CQ-17 'mothership' flying at 20,000 feet. The wing tips of the bomber were painted white as well as a long white strip along the length of the fuselage to make the plane more visible. The USAAF could only control the drone on its horizontal axis. The drone was packed with explosives weighing more than twice that of a B-17's normal bomb payload. Moreover, the British Torpex used for the payload as it was 50% more powerful than TNT.

The remote control system used was insufficient for safe takeoff, so each drone was taken aloft by a volunteer pilot and a volunteer flight engineer to an altitude of 2,000 ft (600 m) for transfer of control to the CQ-17 operators. After successful turnover of the drones controls the two-man crew would arm the payload and parachute out of the cockpit. The 'mothership' would then direct the plane to the target. Radio-controlled flight was in its infancy and each service branch kept their research secret. The technology employed by the USAAF was so primitive that no practice mission was successful. Part of the problem was the English weather. In order for the mission to succeed they needed what aviators call CAVU conditions (ceiling and visibility unlimited) for at least one hour over the target and one hour at RAF Fersfield, the launch site, a rare occurrence. Even when the weather was perfect none of the B-17 test planes could successfully fly a box course remotely.

Enter the US Navy. Traverse City Naval Air Station was the headquarters for the Navy's drone planes. For years they had been perfecting target drones to train the Fleet in hitting aircraft. They volunteered a brand new B-24 as their operational entry. The airplane was stripped and newly acquired television cameras were placed in the cockpit where the mothership could observe what the plane was doing without actually seeing it. Plus the Navy had control of two axis, left-right and up-down. The USAAF personnel were incensed. They knew their system was rudimentary compared to the Navy's but they had been working on the problem longer and if given more time their planes could win out and destroy the German launch sites. But Generals can not wait. On August 4, 1944 the air force put 4 B-17s in the air. On the first flight both the pilot and engineer successfully parachuted, but when the auto-pilot was engaged the plane spun out of control and crashed into the sea. In the second flight the drone crashed into the woods before being armed and the pilot was killed. Same day, third mission, after the pilot bailed out the plane dove into the ground before the engineer could escape making a huge crater and destroying more than 2000 acres of the surrounding countryside. The fourth flight made it over the Channel and approached the target but hit several hundred feet short and did no damage. Trying to aim a plane going 250 mph and hitting a 16' X 20' opening from 20,000 feet is asking for a miracle.

Two days later CAVU conditions were present and three flights were launched. All crew members bailed out successfully but friendly ground fire downed one plane (a common occurrence for any plane flying over parts of England), enemy flak downed the second and the third lost control, circled toward Ipswich but crashed at sea. The Navy was next. As all pilots were volunteers, you still had to be in the theater to volunteer. Lieutenant Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. should have been long gone. He was a PBY pilot doing anti-submarine patrols over the Bay of Biscay. He had already flown his required 25 missions, volunteered for another 25 and was 10 flights into his third deployment; but his

younger brother was a hero, and a wounded one at that. LTJG John F. Kennedy was recuperating at the family compound in Hyannis Port basking in the limelight. The older brother, his father's favorite, had not only not sunk a German U-boat, he had never even seen one. When the opportunity came to volunteer for a dangerous mission he leapt at the chance. All he knew was that they needed a pilot but he needed to become a hero.

Embittered by the early failures many of the Army Air Corps personnel made no attempt to hide their resentment of the small naval contingent and their shiny, new B-24. The Army commander, LTC Ray Forrest was intensely interested in the Navy's approach and walked up to their aircraft and climbed into the cockpit. He was impressed. The equipment was far more sophisticated than anything the Army had produced but then he looked at the arming panel that would detonate the 21,170 pounds of Torpex. He told his Navy guide that "this looks like something you'd make with a number two Erector set and Lincoln Logs." Forrest was not an electronics expert, but he knew a dangerously cold-soldered joint when he saw one, and he knew that screwing a plywood circuit board directly to a steel aircraft bulkhead invited a whole mess of short-circuits and voltage spikes. Most of all he knew what a jerry-built piece of junk looked like and that plywood piece was deadly. The Navy guide said that it came straight from the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia where they certainly should know what they were doing.

That evening Forrest brought up his concerns to a colonel in the Third Bomb Division HG. He replied "It's their problem." Forrest exclaimed that "It's a matter of conscience to me, and they've got it wrong. They're gonna try to blow a load of 12 tons of Torpex with an arming system that's about as safe as a basketful of rattlesnakes." Raising a fresh martini the senior officer proposed a toast: "To you and your wild imagination. When the Navy blows up its drone, give me a ring. Nobody wanted the Navy here in the first place."

Late in the afternoon, August 12, 1944, CAVU conditions were declared and at 1752 hours Lieutenant Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. and Lieutenant Wilford J. Willy took off. Eighteen minutes into the flight Kennedy radioed that the aircraft was trimmed, the autopilot was set and engaged and the B-24 was ready for handoff to the mothership. The mothership assumed control and steered the plane to its first checkpoint. After five minutes radar showed the plane to be 12 miles off course. Elliot Roosevelt, the President's son had just taken a few pictures from his P-38 chase plane and was veering away. At 1820 hours the mothership made a slight correction and the B-24 blew apart over the Blyth River estuary above the Westwood Marshes. A trailing pilot said it was the "biggest explosion I ever saw until the pictures of the atomic bomb. A terrific flame and many, many pieces."

On the afternoon of August 13 a pair of naval chaplains knocked on the screen door of the Kennedy compound. Rose answered the door and was asked to get her husband. She heard first that their son "was missing in action and presumed lost." She ran upstairs to get Joe Sr. who came down. Seeing the chaplains there he ushered them into another room. Ted Kennedy later recounted that "when they emerged, the room was soon awash in tears. Some wailed. Dad stumbled back upstairs. He didn't want any of us to witness his grief." Jack said: "Joe wouldn't want us sitting here crying. He would want us to go sailing. Let's go sailing." And so they did.

Three weeks later the Canadians entered the Fortress at Mimoyecques and saw that it had long been abandoned. After the July raid the Germans still made the site appear active. They correctly surmised that it would consume Allied assets and lives. Final score—18 up, 18 down, no hits. The Kennedys never attempted to ask about the circumstances of Joe's death. In 1962 President Kennedy toured the naval base at Point Magu, California. Former LTC Roy Forrest was an electronic engineer there and was informed that the President wanted to have a long talk with him. Forrest refused and when asked why? He replied: "I don't want to have to tell him the truth." The truth is still a mystery. Was it a cover-up, an embarrassment, or an oversight? They never had their talk.

Arctic Convoys

Almost everybody in the Army or Navy who saw action will always claim that his theater of operations was the toughest, but among merchant seamen there never was any argument. For pure unadulterated hell there wasn't any time or place to compare with that long, bloody run to Murmansk. People claimed that the seamen were only civilians with big pockets to hold all the dough they made. But no ever took into account that more than 10,000 men and 1200 ships were lost in the icy waters of the North Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Sea. The ships in the convoy would plod along like one of a herd of cows moving through a pasture filled with wolves, and it was a case of how many wolves could pull you down before you reached a safe port. And you could not even run for it, not at 7 1/2 knots. It took a certain type of man to stand that kind of tension day after day. Many men just made one trip to sea with the Merchant Marine, and then joined the Army, Navy or Marines.



Russian convoys assembled in Iceland and were designated PQ, returning convoys were denoted as Q, either sailing in ballast or with passengers (generally survivors of sunken merchant ships, British servicemen, and Soviet diplomats). Sailing through the northern waters was not an easy task, as the waters of the Barents Sea as well as the neighboring Norwegian Sea and Kara Sea were known for unpredictable storms. The cold temperature in the arctic region also posed a risk in that sea splashes slowly formed a layer of ice on the decks of ships, which over time, if not tended to, could weigh so much that ships would become top-heavy and capsize. The threats, natural or otherwise, endangered the merchant ships throughout the entire length of the supply route.

There was always a shortage of trained seamen. So many had died that in 1942 some ships were going out with just two or three experienced men aboard. One such ship was the *SS Induna*. It loaded in Baltimore, joined a small convoy off Norfolk, added 12 more ships abeam of New York. 20 more British ships joined the convoy off Newfoundland where they then sailed for Iceland. 26 days and 3000 miles from Baltimore the *Induna* reached Iceland. It was mid-November and no shore leave was allowed. The harbor was full of ships waiting for assignment to various convoys. On the 27th of December *Induna* became part of PQ-17. Of the PQ and QP series of convoys, PQ-17 suffered particularly heavy losses. It had an inauspicious start when a ship became grounded upon leaving Hvalfjörður north of Reykjavik, while another became damaged by floating ice in the Denmark Strait. The remaining 33 merchant ships, supported by a tanker and escorted by the usual array of destroyers, anti-aircraft vessels, corvettes, minesweepers, and trawlers were attacked by large formations of German torpedo bombers while two heavy cruisers, *Lützow* and *Admiral Scheer*, with supporting destroyers set sail to intercept. To deal with the surface threat, PQ-17 was ordered to scatter and the escorts ordered to return to Iceland. The resulting small groups of merchant ships were picked off along the way for the next week. By the time the first of the PQ-17 merchant ships began to arrive at Arkhangelsk, 24 of them, about 60% of the convoy, were lost. 64,000 metric tons of war goods went to the bottom of the sea. The heavy losses of PQ-17 were criticized, but convoying through this northern route would continue, albeit paused for the remainder of the summer of 1942, waiting for daylight hours to shorten.

While PQ-17 stood out as one of the more disastrous missions, many of the other 77 arctic convoy missions suffered losses as well, including the later JW and RA series of convoys that ran between December 1942 and the end of the European War in May 1945. In total, 104 Allied merchant ships were sunk with the arctic convoys, along with 18 warships; 829 merchant mariners and 1,944 navy personnel were killed aboard them. The Soviet Union lost 30 merchant ships and an unknown number of personnel. In the attempt to disrupt the convoys, the Germans lost 5 surface warships, 31 submarines, and many aircraft.

Second Mate Robert Lund writes of his time in convoy PQ-12. Of the 47 ships, 28 were left when they reached the Barents Sea. Nineteen had been sunk and there was still a long ways to go. Men were asking why they sent ships into a hell like this. Lund replied: "Murmansk was the only ice-free port in the north, and from it a railroad ran 900 miles south to Leningrad. We had to get the stuff to the Russians to show that we were trying to help." When they reached Murmansk the wounded and rescued survivors went to a hospital. Hundreds of men had been pulled out of the water with their hands and feet frozen. Hands and feet that turned gangrenous and had to be amputated. These men were civilians and there would be no medals, pensions or GI Bill benefits for them. After unloading, a convoy in ballast was assembled and they sailed home. Four months after leaving Baltimore Lund reached New York. "Everyman aboard looked like they had aged ten years. After Murmansk the rest of the war was a breeze." Lund shuttled in the Med; was at Salerno and made two trips to Anzio. Was at Omaha Beach D+1 and later in Antwerp. When asked if he would ever make another trip to Murmansk he said "I would have jumped ship first."

The following is a recollection of a Murmansk survivor:

Convoy PQ 17 from Iceland to Murmansk consisted of a combination of American and British merchant shipping. They were about 120 miles north of Russia when they came under attack and the US ship SS Ballot was sunk. The survivors were transferred to the British ship SS Induna. Then the Induna was sunk. Austin Byrne was a survivor and describes the terror of the convoy ordeal.

The next morning at 0730, the *SS Induna* was torpedoed in the #5 hold right under a load of aviation fuel and the explosion turned the deck into a burning inferno. We were sent to boat stations and a few people started to run through the fire while some on the stern jumped into the sea away from the flames. The last man was one of those rescued from the *SS Ballot* and he had no shoes on so his feet were ripped open by the cargo of barbed wire and he was leaving bloody footprints as he made his way to the lifeboat station. The Mate then lowered the boat to deck level and myself with some others were ordered into the boat and this was when we saw this man coming towards us—his hair was burned off and his face and hands were badly burned. His jacket and trousers were also burning and we rolled him into the boat and beat out the flames.

The boat was lowered into the sea and as we rowed away another torpedo smashed into the ship, which then sank with all the men who were still aboard. We were in the lifeboat for four days in terrible weather. After all it was winter in the Arctic and we were in the Barents Sea.

The burned man had few clothes and he sat in the boat with the seas breaking over him and we covered him with a blanket and spare coat. The other six in the boat were of no help, so the gunner and myself did all of the baling. We tried to talk to his man but the poor soul could hardly talk but I did get out of him that he came from America.

The seas broke over him, forming a coat of ice that got thicker as time went by but never once did he moan but just sat quietly and all that he ever asked for was the occasional cigarette, which I would light for him and put it into his mouth. He would then try to move his head when I should take it out and that was all he asked for. A few times a day he would say, "Gunner, can I have a cigarette?"

This went on for the four days we were adrift and then at dusk on the fourth day we sighted land. When we told him he asked, "Gunner, will you please turn the boat so that I can see it?" This we did. His next words were, "Put an oar into my hands and I can rock my body to help." His hands were twice as thick as they should be with his fingers drawn and bent with the cold—all black with knuckles burst and covered with scabs. And he still wanted to help!

We saw the rescue boats and they picked us up. As I was pulled aboard I saw a Russian sailor down in the lifeboat as I was taken to the bridge. The next time I saw him was after one of the females in the Russian crew called to me. She was having difficulty with the cabin boy—a 17-year-old lad named Anderson. He was frozen, bent double and having to cut his jacket off, I saw that he was black to the waist. When she saw this the Russian said to leave him.

After a few tots of vodka, I was taken to see the burned man who put out his hand to me and said as best as he could, "We made it kid!" Words that I will never forget from a man who was now suffering from both burns and terrible frostbite. The next day we arrived in Murmansk and were put into a Russian hospital where I went to sleep. When I woke up, I was told that the cabin boy died and later that the burned man had also died from his injuries.

Operation Paperclip

After WWII ended in 1945, victorious Russian and American intelligence teams began a treasure hunt throughout occupied Germany for military and scientific booty. They were looking for things like new rocket and aircraft designs, medicines, and electronics. They were also hunting down the most precious 'spoils' of all: the scientists whose work had nearly won the war for Germany, the engineers and intelligence officers of the Nazi War Machine.

The U.S. Military rounded up Nazi scientists and brought them to America. They had originally intended merely to debrief them and send them back to Germany. But when it realized the extent of the scientists knowledge and expertise, the War Department decided it would be a waste to send the scientists home. Following the discovery of flying discs (foo fighters), particle/laser beam weaponry in German military bases, the War Department decided that United States must control this technology, and the Nazi engineers that had worked on them. There was only one problem: it was illegal. U.S. law explicitly prohibited Nazi officials from immigrating to America--and as many as three-quarters of the scientists in question had been committed Nazis.

Convinced that German scientists could help America's postwar efforts, President Harry Truman agreed in September 1946 to authorize "Project Paperclip", a program to bring selected German scientists to work on America's behalf during the "Cold War". However, Truman expressly excluded anyone found "to have been a member of the Nazi party and more than a nominal participant in its activities, or an active supporter of Naziism or militarism." The War Department's Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) conducted background investigations of the scientists. In February 1947, JIOA Director Bosquet Wev submitted the first set of scientists' dossiers to the State and Justice Departments for review.

The dossiers were damning. Samauel Klaus, the State Departments representative on the JIOA board, claimed that all the scientists in this first batch were "ardent Nazis." Their visa requests were denied. Wev was furious. He wrote a memo warning that "the best interests of the United States have been subjugated to the efforts expended in 'beating a dead Nazi horse.'" He also declared that the return of these scientists to Germany, where they could be exploited by America's enemies, presented a "far greater security threat to this country than any former Nazi affiliations which they may have had or even any Nazi sympathies that they may still have."

When the JIOA formed to investigate the backgrounds and form dossiers on the Nazis, the Nazi Intelligence leader Reinhard Gehlen met with the CIA director Allen Dulles. Dulles and Gehlen hit it off immediately. Gehlen was a master spy for the Nazis and had infiltrated Russia with his vast Nazi Intelligence network. Dulles promised Gehlen that his Intelligence unit was safe in the CIA. Apparently, Wev decided to sidestep the problem. Dulles had the scientists dossier's re-written to eliminate incriminating evidence. As promised, Allen Dulles delivered the Nazi Intelligence unit to

the CIA, which later opened many umbrella projects stemming from Nazi mad research (MK-ULTRA / ARTICHOKE, OPERATION MIDNIGHT CLIMAX) to name just a few.

Military Intelligence "cleansed" the files of any Nazi references. By 1955, more than 760 German scientists had been granted citizenship in the U.S. and given prominent positions in the American scientific community. Many had been longtime members of the Nazi party and the Gestapo. They had conducted experiments on humans at concentration camps, had used slave labor, and had committed other war crimes.

In a 1985 expose in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Linda Hunt wrote that she had examined more than 130 reports on Project Paperclip subjects--and every one "had been changed to eliminate the security threat classification." President Truman, who had explicitly ordered no committed Nazis to be admitted under Project Paperclip, was evidently never aware that his directive had been violated. State Department archives and the memoirs of officials from that era confirm this. In fact, according to Clarence Lasby's book Project Paperclip (1975), project officials "covered their designs with such secrecy that it bedeviled their own President. At Potsdam he denied their activities and undoubtedly enhanced Russian suspicion and distrust," quite possibly fueling the Cold War even further.

A good example of how these dossiers were changed is the case of Wernher von Braun. A September 18, 1947, report on the German rocket scientist stated, "Subject is regarded as a potential security threat by the Military Governor." The following February, a new security evaluation of Von Braun said, "No derogatory information is available on the subject. It is the opinion of the Military Governor that he may not constitute a security threat to the United States."

Project Paperclip was stopped in 1957, when West Germany protested to the U.S. that these efforts had stripped it of "scientific skills." There was no comment about supporting Nazis. Paperclip may have ended in 1957 but the ramifications of Paperclip are world-wide. The Nazis became employed CIA agents, engaging in clandestine work with the likes of George Bush, the CIA, Henry Kissinger, and the Masonic P2 lodge (an Italian/Fascist/Vatican organization). One umbrella project that was spawned from Paperclip was MK-ULTRA. A secret laboratory was established and funded by CIA director, Allen Dulles in Montreal, Canada at McGill University in the Allen Memorial Institute headed by psychiatrist Dr. Ewen Cameron. For the next several years Dr. Ewen Cameron experimented with drug effects (LSD) and shock therapy without patient consent. What is ironic about Dr. Cameron is that he served as a member of the Nuremberg tribunal who heard the cases against the Nazi doctors.

When it was at its height in drug experiments, operation MK-ULTRA expanded. This was the brainchild of Richard Helms who later came to be a CIA director. It was designed to defeat the "enemy" in its brain-washing techniques. MK-ULTRA had another arm involved in Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) known as MK-DELTA. The "doctors" who participated in these experiments used some of the same techniques as the Nazi "doctors". Techniques used by Dr. Cameron and previous Nazi scientists include electro shock, sleep deprivation, memory implantation, memory erasure, sensory modification, psychoactive drug experiments, and many more cruel practices.

Paperclip ultimately spawned a great many other projects still classified to this day. The results of the various projects were devastating, and very far reaching. I guess that is what you would expect from collaborating with Nazis. Over 700 suspicious characters and their families were allowed into our country. It can be argued that the expertise they brought to our shores was probably invaluable but was the cost of such knowledge worth the price. We compromised principles to gain something that could have been achieved eventually by other means. Vanity and hubris, again to the front.